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based upon inferences from evidence. Thus, the art of advocacy
would play its rightful part in presenting a reasonable guideline
to the jury.
None of the pro-Botta arguments are adequate to refute the value
of the per diem method of ascertaining damages for pain and suffering. The instant case held that use of the per diem approach in
computing damages for pain and suffering was reversible error
even though the jury's verdict was not per se excessive. Judge
Brown in dissenting said, "... . if the evil feared is excessive verdicts,
then the cure ought to be directed against the product, not the
practice." Excessive verdicts may be cured by a trial judge's
proper use of discretion in preventing unreasonable arguments
based on the per diem approach. The court's instructions to the
jury should clarify the fact that the per diem argument by counsel
was merely for illustrative purposes and not evidence of a sum
certain. The use of the per diem method in West Virginia would
be of valuable assistance to juries and would take the formulation
of a verdict for pain and suffering from the realm of speculation.
James Truman Cooper

Libel and Slander-The Innocent Construction Rule
As an employee of the defendant corporation, P was responsible
for calculating the cordage of wood shipped to the corporation mill
in another city. His figures compared favorably with those of the
mill for a period of five years. Suddenly, for some inexplicable
reason, an unusual discrepancy persisted. As a consequence P was
discharged. At a meeting of some corporation employees, D made
reference to the trouble involving P and linked it with another
problem involving inventory shortage where an employee had been
dismissed under a strong suspicion of stealing. Although D maintained that his intent was only to charge P with negligence or inefficiency, witnesses who knew the facts concerning the inventory
shortage inferred that D's statement was an accusation that P was
guilty of stealing pulpwood. In the slander action brought by P
against D and the corporation, the trial court denied D's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Held, affirmed. Where
words allegedly slanderous may be given either an innocent or a
slanderous interpretation, the jury must determine the sense in
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which the words were used in light of the extrinsic circumstances.
Davis v. Niederhof, 143 S.E.2d 367 (S.C. 1965).
In modern usage, slander means defamation by spoken words
which tend to prejudice the reputation or means of livelihood of
another. Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W.2d
13 (1943). A categorical analysis of allegedly defamatory words
reveals three distinct divisions: (1) those which cannot possibly
bear a defamatory meaning, (2) those which are obviously defamatory, (3) those which are ambiguous and susceptible of either
an innocent or a slanderous interpretation. 53 C.J.S. Libel & Slander
§ 5 (1948). In order to distinguish between the latter two categories, courts have designated words which require innuendo to
support the defamatory meaning as slander per quod and words
which are defamatory without explanation as slander per se.
Brewer v. Hearst Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1950).
Ambiguous language presents a dilemma that has been difficult
for courts to resolve. The struggle to establish and define a measurable standard by which the courts may test the sufficiency of a
claim has been a significant objective in the development of
defamation law. In striving to attain such an objective, judicial
efforts have been stymied by a conflict between the desire of the
courts to control the number of defamation actions and the
traditional role of the jury in the determination of such objectionable language. Note, The Innocent Construction Rule: A Minority
of One, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 524, 525 (1963).
As in the instant case, courts of the various states generally have
permitted the jury to make this determination. Such policy has
some merit when considered in the light of the general principle
that it is the province of the court to determine whether the words
are capable of defamatory meaning and the province of the jury to
determine in what sense the words were used. Rocky Mountain
News PrintingCo. v. Fridborn,46 Colo. 440, 104 Pac. 956 (1909).
However, the approach affords very little power to the court in the
determination of whether words of this type shall be actionable.
A second approach to the dilemma of ambiguity involves the
proof of damages. At common law all libel and some slander was
actionable regardless of damage; but with the increasing number
of defamation actions, courts have found it necessary to modify
and limit this general principle. The most popular modification
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has been to apply the libel per se doctrine, requiring that special
damages be pleaded if the defamatory meaning does not appear
without resort to innuendo. Note, Defamation, 69 HARv. L. Rtv.
875,889 (1956).
In dealing with this problem, the Illinois courts have developed
the innocent construction rule. The rule requires that allegedly
defamatory words which are capable of an innocent interpretation
must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law.
John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105 (1962). The
doctrine is predicated upon the desirability of according to the
courts the power to control defamation actions. Its effect is to
broaden the scope of nonactionable language. In its ultimate
refinement, the rule would require a complainant to prove a prima
facie case that the defamatory meaning was the only inference to
be drawn. Note, 30 U. Cm. L. Rtv., supra at 524.
The courts in Illinois have successfully employed the doctrine
on appellate and federal levels for more than a decade. Porcella v.
Time, Inc., 300 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962); Alster v. Illinois Soc'y of
Professional Engrs., 56 IMI. App. 2d 145, 205 N.E.2d 658 (1965);
John v. Tribune Co., supra. Its success in other jurisdictions has
been minimal. After seventeen years of existence in California,
the California Supreme Court reversed its position because of the
unlimited possible scope in applying the doctrine. MacLeod v.
Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959).
Despite the misuse of the doctrine in California in Peabody v.
Barham, 52 Cal. App. 2d 581, 126 P.2d 668 (1942), the innocent
construction rule when applied within reason may be of value in
controlling the principles of defamation law. In Illinois the rule
has been applied in three recurring instances: (1) where -an
individual has been ascribed membership in or sympathy with a
controversial group, (2) where the individual can only be identified
by colloquium, (3) where the publication is true but has the unintended effect of defaming an individual. Note, 30 U. Cmr. L. RBv.,
supraat 532.
However, a finding of an innocent interpretation in one of these
instances may not preclude the plaintiffs recovery in Illinois. The
court has left unanswered the question of whether the words are
actionable if the plaintiff alleges special damages. The ultimate
answer will depend upon the court's interpretation of the purpose
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of the rule. If the rule has been adopted to define a minimum
standard of defamation, pleading special damages would not effect
a different result. On the other hand, if the purpose is to establish
a basis from which the court may presume general damages, proof
of special damages would guarantee recovery despite the innocent
character of the words. Note, 30 U. Cm. L. REV., supra at 530.
Dicta in some recent Illinois cases applying the rule would seem
to support the latter viewpoint. In Eiek v. Perk Dog Food Co.,
347 M11. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952), the court held that the
defendant's statements were not of such a character that the court
would presume special damages. Moreover, in Hambric v. Field
Enterprises,46 Ill. App. 2d 355, 196 N.E.2d 489 (1964), the court
found that the words were not libelous per se and, therefore, required proof of special damages.
The approach to ambiguity in West Virginia is in part regulated
by statute. The insulting words statute makes actionable all words
which from their ordinary usage are construed as insults and tend
to result in violence and breach of peace. The statute further
provides that no demurrer shall preclude a jury from passing on
the language. In an effort to suppress dueling, the legislature
passed this statute. The singular aspect of this statute is that,
unlike common law defamation, no publication of defamation is
required by the statute. W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 7, § 2 (Michie
1961).
Although in light of the statutory provision the law seems settled
in this area, a review of the cases involving language regulated
by the statute reveals some inconsistencies. Moreover, where the
language fails to fall within the scope of the statute an entirely
different result is possible.
In City of Mullens v. Davidson, 133 W. Va. 557, 57 S.E.2d 1
(1949), the court held that the statute operates to deprive the court
of the power to entertain a demurrer which would preclude the
jury from passing upon the language. The court in this instance
relied upon the ruling in Barger v. Hood, 87 W. Va. 78, 104 S.E.
280 (1920), where the court held that it was the contemplation of
the legislature that juries were better qualified to determine what
language is insulting.
However, a different result was reached in Parker v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 126 W. Va. 666, 30 S.E.2d 1 (1944).
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Despite the statute the court held that the demurrer should have
been sustained because the statement unexplained by innuendo was
not defamatory and that the declaration alleged no state of facts
which would justify the meaning the plaintiff was attempting to
attach. This inconsistent position is noted in the opinion of City of
Mullens v. Davidson, supra, but the Parkercase was not overruled.
The language of Argabright v. Jones, 46 W. Va. 144, 32 S.E. 995
(1899) does not seem to fall within the statute. In this instance,
the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the decision because
of failure to sustain a demurrer. The demurrer was grounded upon
the theory that there was no basis for inferring that the statement
applied to the plaintiff. In reversing the decision, the court said:
"Looking, then, at the article as it appeared, we cannot say that
it warrants the construction sought to be placed upon it by
innuendoes." The added significance of the Argabright decision is
that the factual situation is analogous to the type of case where
the Illinois court has applied the innocent construction rule. The
similitude involves an attempt by a plaintiff not a target of the
defamation to attach defamatory meaning by innuendo.
These decisions seem to indicate a desire of the court to retain
some control over construction despite the statute. Supporting
this viewpoint is the following statement by the court in Alderson
v. Kahle, 73 W. Va. 690, 80 S.E. 1109 (1914): "The defendant is
not necessarily held to accountability for the use of words in their
technical or even ordinary meaning." The language and actions
of the West Virginia court are perhaps an indication that the court
follows the Illinois doctrine in form if not in expressed theory.
Ellen FairfaxWarder

Labor Law-Member's Right to Presence of
Counsel in Union Hearings
P,a union member, sought injunctive relief and damages from an
alleged denial of a "full and fair" hearing in a union disciplinary
proceeding. He contended that it was impossible to have had
a fair hearing because he was not permitted the presence of counsel
from outside the union membership in his behalf. P further asserted
that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
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